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Abstract
In Security, monitors and enforcement mechanisms run in parallel with
programs to check, and modify their run-time behaviour, respectively, in
order to guarantee the satisfaction of a security policy. For the same pol-
icy, several enforcement strategies are possible. We provide a framework
for quantitative monitoring and enforcement. Enforcement strategies are
analysed according to user-defined parameters. This is done by extending
the notion controller processes, that mimics the well-known edit automata,
with weights on transitions, valued in a C-semiring. C-semirings permit
one to be flexible and general in the quantitative criteria. Furthermore, we
provide some examples of orders on controllers that are evaluated under
incomparable criteria.
1 Introduction
Security is often regarded as a binary concept. Behaviour is either good or bad.
Good behaviour is either enforced or not. Still, in many cases we do not deal
with just two security values. Reality is much more complex and may force
us to consider several quantitative aspects that play a role in the design and
evaluation of enforcement strategies. For example:
• a controller can cost less than another one in enforcing a specific security
policy;
∗The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grants no 256980 (NESSoS) and no
295354 (SESAMO).
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• systems are not always deterministic; choice points can play a role in
several regards, including providing information that may help the design
of enforcement strategies;
• the benefits, in a certain domain, of enforcing a specific policy, may fail
to counter-balance the disadvantages in a different domain.
Proper analysis of the situation paves the way to complex decisions in the
controlling phase that take several parameters into account. In this work, we
deal with such quantitative aspects of security, and especially of the monitoring
and enforcement of security policies.
There is a significant bulk of work devoted to the study of enforcement
strategies. Several formal models have been defined during the last decade. We
recall as foremost examples security automata (see e.g., [30, 2]). These al-
low to control target systems by suppressing, inserting, or editing their output
sequences. Other approaches make use of concurrent languages (such as pro-
cess algebras), that model both the target and the control system in the same
formalism [22, 23, 20, 15].
One can consider several quantitative dimensions, such as cost, time, risk,
or even trust. All these different domains demand for a parametric approach
when modelling targets and controllers. We address this aspect by using C-
semirings, that are widely adopted as a domain for optimization problems [4].
C-semirings account for multi-dimensional valuations, and establish a partial
order on values. We chose a variant of the quantitative process algebra GPA [7]
as the language to express controllers and targets. This process algebra provides
CSP-style synchronization, and actions weighted over a semiring.
After providing the necessary background about C-semirings and GPA, in
Section 2 we define quantitative evaluation of processes and their traces. The
goal of the paper is to provide a quantitative evaluation of enforcement processes
in order to be able to compare different strategies according to several measures.
We make a distinction between monitors and controllers. Monitors (Section 3)
can be used to associate quantities to an existing system without changing
its behaviour. Our framework is conservative, in the sense that a classical
boolean security policy can be monitored using the boolean C-semiring. On the
other hand, controllers (Section 4) are able to modify the behaviour of a target
by using control actions for suppressing or inserting possible incorrect actions.
Finally, in Section 5 we study the formal grounds of quantitative evaluation and
comparisons of controllers. This permits one to compare different strategies in
terms of their evaluations with respect to different measures, e.g., security, cost,
trust, energy, and so on. Multi-dimensional criteria are indeed possible in the
general framework of C-semirings. As a noteworthy example, prioritization of
one dimension over the others can be obtained by the means of the lexicographic
C-semiring.
To sum up, we propose a parametric framework that describes systems,
monitors and controllers with several quantitative aspects in a uniform way,
and permits one to reason about the trade-off among different measures. The
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use of semirings allows one to combine different domains, while the quantitative
process algebra that we use enables one to reason in a compositional manner.
2 Quantitative Processes
In this section we shall introduce quantitative processes employing C-semirings.
2.1 C-semirings
First, we briefly introduce C-semirings (see [4] for a thorough introduction).
Definition 1 (C-semiring) A C-semiring is a tuple K = (K,
∑
, ∗,0,1) where
• K is a set, with 0 and 1 elements of K.
• ∑ : P(K) → K with ∑{a} = a, ∑ ∅ = 0, ∑K = 1, ∑(⋃Ki) =∑{∑Ki} for Ki ⊆ K, i ≥ 0
• ∗ : K ×K → K is commutative, associative, distributive over ∑; 1 is its
unit element, and 0 is its absorbing element.
We write k1 + k2 for
∑{k1, k2}, making + a commutative, associative and
idempotent operator by definition.
Many examples of C-semirings can be found in the literature, such as:
the Boolean C-semiring KB = 〈{true, false},∨,∧, false, true〉, for logical val-
ues and operations; the Cost C-semiring KC = 〈R+0 ,min,+,+∞, 0〉; the Trust
C-semiring KT = 〈[0, 1],max,min, 0, 1〉.
Every C-semiring is endowed with a partial order v, such that k1 v k2 if,
and only if k1 + k2 = k2. This partial order intuitively indicates a notion of
preference, such that k1 v k2 can be read as k2 is “better” than k1.
It is worth notice that C-semirings can be composed. For instance, the carte-
sian product of C-semirings is a C-semiring, having elements in the cartesian
product of the two sets of values, and operations defined point-wise. Further
compositions techniques exist, such as the lexicographic C-semiring, the expec-
tation semiring, etc.
In general, given three C-semirings K1, K2 and K3, a composition operator
is a function  : K1 × K2 → K3. In most cases, the support set of K3 is
K3 = K1 × K2. The additive and multiplicative operators can change from
one composition to another. Given two values k1 ∈ K1 and k2 ∈ K2 we write
k3 = k1  k2 for the corresponding composite value in K3.
Example 1 Given K1 = (K1,
∑
1, ∗1,01,11) and K2 = (K2,
∑
2, ∗2,02,12),
the lexicographic composition operator L is defined such that K1 L K2 =
(K3,
∑
3, ∗3,03,13), where K3 = K1×K2, 03 = (01,02), 13 = (11,12), and for
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any k1, k
′
1 ∈ K1 and any k2, k′2 ∈ K2:
(k1, k2) +3 (k
′
1, k
′
2) =

(k1, k2) if k
′
1 v1 k1 or
k1 = k
′
1 and k
′
2 v2 k2
(k′1, k
′
2) otherwise.
(k1, k2) ∗3 (k′1, k′2) = (k1 ∗1 k′1, k2 ∗2 k′2)
2.2 Quantitative process specifications
Along this paper we describe the behaviour of controllers and targets in terms
of process algebras and semirings. In particular we use Generalized Process
Algebra (GPA), introduced in [7], in order to specify quantitative aspects of
process transitions.
Definition 2 The set L of agents, or processes, in Generalized Process Algebra
(GPA) over a set of finite transition labels Act and a C-semiring K is defined
by the grammar
A ::= 0 | (a, k).A | A+A | A‖SA | X
where a ∈ Act, k ∈ K and S,L ⊆ Act, and X belongs to a countable set of
process variables.
Notice that the original formulation of GPA used semirings, whereas we need
to be more restrictive, as we will need to consider infinite sums, quantified over
the (infinite) set of traces of a process. In semirings, the additive operation is
binary, so they are defined (inductively) only on finite sets.
Furthermore, we divert from the original formulation of GPA in that we
do not assume that each transition has a weight k 6= 0. This is because we
are interested in distinguishing between processes that do not perform a given
action and processes that perform it with weight 0.
The definition of the syntax adopts typical constructs of process algebras
[26, 29]. We assume a defining equation X , A for each variable appearing
in a term, and we assume that processes have guarded recursion, that is, all
the variables in a process are directly under some prefix. We omit the hiding
operator from GPA as we will introduce more fine-grained control operators in
Section 4. The intuitive meaning of the operators is as follows:
• 0 describes the termination of a process.
• (a, k).A performs the action a with a certain weight k and then behaves
as A.
• A+A′ non-deterministically behaves as either A or A′.
• A‖SA′ describes the process in which A and A′ proceed concurrently and
independently on all actions which are not in S. All the action in S are
performed if and only if both the process perform the same action in S at
the same time.
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Table 1: Operational semantics for GPA [7].
(a, k).A
a,k→ A
A
a,k→ A1 A′ a,l→ A′1
A‖S A′ a,k∗l→ A1‖S A′1
a ∈ S
A
a,k→ A1
X
a,k→ A1
X , A A
a,k→ A1
A‖S A′ a,k→ A1‖S A
a 6∈ S
Aj
a,k→ A1∑
i∈I
Ai
a,kΣ→ A1
j ∈ I A
′ a,k→ A′1
A‖S A′ a,k→ A‖S A′1
a 6∈ S
where kΣ =
∑
i∈I(Ai
a→ A1)
The formal semantics of operators (Table 1) is expressed in terms of multiple
labelled transition system (MLTS for short). Similarly to weighted automata
[13], MLTSs are labelled transition systems with weights on labels, that we
define below. Notice that there is no need to maintain a distinction between
GPA processes and states of the corresponding MLTS, as they coincide (which
is typical in process calculi).
Definition 3 A (finite) multi labelled transition system (MLTS) is a tuple1
(S,Act,K, δ), where S is the state space which is countable (finite), Act is a
finite set of transition labels, K is a semiring used for the definition of transition
costs, and δ : S ×Act× S → K is the transition function.
Remark 1 The definition of an MLTS syntactically resembles that of a weighted
automaton [13]. Semantically speaking, weighted automata denote (weighted)
languages, that is, properties, whereas MLTSs are models, similarly to the case
of classical automata and labelled transition systems.
In run-time enforcement, one should not tell processes apart by their internal
choices, but rather by their execution traces. In this light, we define quantitative
evaluation of predicates over agents. In the following, let A be an agent and
consider the corresponding MLTS with set of states S.
Definition 4 Given states s1, s2 ∈ S, we say that t ∈ (Act×K)∗ is a path from
s1 to s2, and write s1
t⇒ s2, if either t is empty, and s1 = s2, or t = (a, k).t′,
and there is s′ ∈ S such that s1 (a,k)→ s′, and t′ is a path from s′ to s2. The label
of t is l(t) = a1 · · · an, ∈ Act∗. We let T (s) be the set of paths from s to some
other state, and we write T (A) to denote the set of paths of a process A.
1In [7], also an initialization function is taken into account, assigning an initial quantita-
tive valuation to each state. In the current paper we do not need it, thus we simplify the
presentation.
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Definition 5 Given a path t = (a1, k1) · · · (an, kn), we define its run weight
|t| = k1 ∗ . . . ∗ kn ∈ K. The label of t is l(t) = a1 · · · an ∈ Act∗.
Finally, we define the notion of valuation of a process, which intuitively corre-
sponds to the best possible quantity of a given process.
Definition 6 Given a process A, the valuation of A is given by JAK, such that
JAK = ∑
{t∈T (A)}
|t|
3 Quantitative monitor operators
Definition 6 assumes that the considered process is already labelled with some
quantities. However, a system, hereafter named target, does not always come
with quantities built-in. Hence, in the most general, the security designer must
provide a labelling function λ, such that given any process A, λ(A) represents
the process A where each edge is labelled with a quantity. A simple example is
the function λ1, which assign the top value 1 of a semiring to each transition.
In practice, the responsibility of measuring a particular aspect is often del-
egated to a monitor, which probes the system and indicates the weight of each
operation. In terms of security, a monitor is usually passive, i.e., it does not ef-
fectively modify the behaviour of the considered target. This means that it does
not prevent violation of a security policy. On the other hand, a controller is able
to modify the behaviour of a target in order to guarantee security requirements.
A security monitor and a security controller are often merged into a single
entity, responsible both for deciding whether an action would violate the policy
and what corrective action should be taken if necessary. We propose here to
make an explicit distinction between these two processes. In this section we
investigate quantitative monitors. Controllers are detailed in Section 4.
Intuitively, a monitor measures a quantity not already present in the moni-
tored target. However, the target might be already equipped with some quan-
tities, coming for instance from another monitor. Hence, we need to merge the
quantities from the monitor with those of the target. As said in Section 2, there
is not a single way to compose C-semirings together, and therefore, the merge
requires a composition operator .
Definition 7 Given a process A labelled with K, a process A′ labelled with L
and a composition operator , we write AA′, semantically defined as:
A
a,k→ A1 A′ a,l→ A′1
AA′ a,kl→ A1 A′1
A merged process can only move on when both of its components can move
on with the same action. Missing transitions from one process can always be
added, but such a choice remains that of the designer in charge of the merge.
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We are now able to define a monitor, which is a process that can be composed
with a target without affecting its behaviour.
Definition 8 Given two C-semirings K1 and K2, a composition operator , a
process A labelled with K1, a process M labelled with K2 is a monitor for A if
and only if L(AM) = L(A), where L(X) = {l(t) | t ∈ T (X)}.
Clearly, given any monitor M and any composition operator , we can define
the labelling function λ(A) = A  M . Note that we consider a process not
coming with any quantity as labelled with the empty set; for this, we can use
the composition operator that simply returns the second argument.
Example 2 Let us consider the simple case of a process A with no existing
weight and with an alphabet Σ = {a, b}. We want to define an energy monitor
using the semiring KC , such that the action a consumes 3 units, and the action
b consumes 2n units, where n is the number of times b has been performed (i.e.,
b has an increasing energy cost). Hence, for n > 0, we define the monitor:
Mn = (a, 3).Mn + (b, 2n).Mn+1
For instance, the process A = a.b.b.a.b can be monitored with A  M1 =
(a, 3).(b, 2).(b, 4).(a, 3).(b, 6). The valuation of the monitored process corresponds
to the total energy consumed, i.e., JAM1K = 18.
It is worth observing here that the valuation of a monitored process returns
only the best possible trace. With the previous example, the monitored process
of B = a + b would be B M1 = (a, 3) + (b, 2), and its valuation JB M1K =
2. Finer-grained approaches can be used to get the valuation of a process, as
discussed in Section 7.
Example 3 Let us now consider a security policy P defined as a predicate on
traces. For instance, in the previous example, consider a policy stating that the
action a cannot be performed before b. Since it is a safety property, we know
from [30] that we can define a controller stopping the system before violating the
policy. Using the boolean semiring KB, we define the following monitor:
MP = (b, true).M
′
P + (a, false).M
′′
P
M ′P = (b, true).M
′
P + (a, true).M
′
P
M ′′P = (b, false).M
′′
P + (a, false).M
′′
P
Roughly speaking, MP observes the first action: if the target executes b, then any
following action is secure, otherwise any following action is not secure. In order
to monitor both security and energy, we consider the lexicographic composition
L defined in Example 1. In other words, a secure trace is always better than
a non-secure one, and two traces equally (non)secure are compared based on
their energy. Hence, given the process A = a + b.a, its monitored version is
given by (AM1)LMP = (a, false, 3) + (b, true, 2).(a, true, 3), and we haveJ(AM1)LMP K = (true, 5).
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Clearly, finer-grained approaches can be used to monitor a security policy.
For instance, in the previous example, we could consider that executing a single
a before a b is somehow “better” than executing a many times. In that case,
we could take the cost semiring KC , and define the monitor as:
MP = (b, 0).M
′
P + (a, 1).M
′′
P
M ′P = (b, 0).MP + (a, 0).M
′
P
M ′′P = (b, 0).M
′
P + (a, 1).M
′′
P
Note that a monitor is only one possible way to build a labelling function λ.
Although monitors are expressive enough for the examples we consider in this
paper, more complex labelling functions may also be of interest.
Remark 2 By construction, the valuation of the empty process is equal to 0,
since the sum of the empty set is equal to 0. For instance, when considering the
quantity for a security policy, the valuation of the empty process would be false.
Although such a value makes sense for liveness properties (where an action
must happen in order for the property to hold), it might be counter-intuitive for
properties that hold on the empty trace. In order to avoid such cases, given any
process A, it is always possible to consider the process Aι, such that Aι
τ,ι→ A,
where ι represents an initialization value. This approach is intuitively similar
to that of Buchholz and Kemper [7], who explicitly introduce an initialization
function.
4 Quantitative control operators
The role of the monitor is to detect a policy violation, and not to prevent a
target system, hereafter denoted by F , from doing so. For this reason it can be
used, for instance, for directly evaluating a security policy P as a value on each
transition of a target process (see Example 3).
A controller E, just like a monitor M , follows target actions step by step.
The difference is that M observes target actions, labelling them with true when
they obey to the policy P or false when they attempt to violate P . On the
contrary, the controller can decide not only to accept but also to change target
traces. The resulting process is the controlled process E . F , following the
semantics given in Table 2.
Intuitively speaking, each rule corresponds to a different controlling be-
haviour. Let us assume a C-semiring with values in K1 and K2 and let k ∈ K1
and k′ ∈ K2. The alphabets of E, F , and of the resulting process E . F are
different, as E may perform control actions that regulate the actions of the tar-
get F , and moreover the resulting process E . F may perform internal actions,
denoted by τ , as a consequence of suppression. From now on, we will let Act
be the alphabet of (the GPA describing) F . The alphabet of E consists of sym-
bols of the form a, a.b, a for a, b ∈ Act, denoting respectively the actions of
acceptance, suppression, and insertion; the alphabet of E . F is Act ∪ {τ}.
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Table 2: MLTS rules for quantitative control operators.
E
a,k→ E′ F a,k
′
→ F ′
E . F
a,k∗k′→ E′ . F ′
(Accept) E
a,k→ E′ F a,k
′
→ F ′
E . F
τ,k∗k′→ E′ . F ′
(Sup)
E
a.b,k→ E′ F a,k
′
→ F ′
E . F
b,k→ E′ . F
(Ins)
The acceptance rule (Accept) constrains the controller and the target to
perform the same action, in order for them to be observed in the resulting
behaviour; the observed weight is the product of those of the controller and the
target. Given two processes A and B, the semantics of truncation is equivalent
to that of CSP-style parallel composition of A and B, where synchronisation is
forced over all actions of the two processes.
The suppression rule (Sup) allows the controller to hide actions of the target.
The target wants to perform the action, but the action is not performed by
the controlled entity2, and the observed result is a τ action, with the weight
calculate as the product of the suppressing and the target action.
Finally, the insertion rule (Ins) describes the capability of correcting some
bad behaviour of the target, by inserting another action in its execution trace.
The weight of insertion is only the weight provided by the controller; this ac-
counts for the fact that the target does not perform any action, but rather stays
in its current state, as in [2].
Example 4 Consider the policy of Example 3, where any trace should start
with at least one action b. Omitting the weights for now, we can define two
controllers: E2 suppresses any action a as long as an action b has not been
performed; E3 inserts an action b if a is submitted first. Both controllers use
an auxiliary controller E1, that accepts any action:
E1 = a.E1 + b.E1
E2 = a.E2 + b.E1
E3 = a.b.E1 + b.E1
Given the sequential target F = a.b, we have
E2 . a.b
τ→ E2 . b b→ E1 . 0
E3 . a.b
b→ E1 . a.b a→ E1 . b b→ 0
2An important aspect of this formalism is the ability of the controller to prevent bad actions
before they happen, meaning that the target is not directly aware that its action has been
suppressed, and keeps going normally. More complex systems exist to represent the interaction
between the target and the controller, such as [17, 19]. Such an extension is considered as
future work.
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The process E3 . F has one more transition than E2 . F , because the insertion
does not change F .
For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider here blocking controllers, pre-
venting the target to perform any action. A classical example of blocking con-
troller is the truncating controller, forbidding the target to perform any action.
In the previous example, a truncating controller could be defined by E4 = b.E1,
meaning that the controlled target E3 . a.b would be simply blocked. The focus
of this paper is to quantify the behaviour of a controlled process, which requires
that the controlling strategy has an observable effect. In practice, truncating
can be achieved by a continuous suppression of any action of the target, for
instance, omitting again any weight, the previous controller E4 has the same
observable effect (i.e., ignoring τ actions) than the following controller E5:
E5 = a.E6 + b.E1
E6 = a.E6 +b.E6
Formally, in the rest of the paper, we only consider controllers obeying to the
following definition.
Definition 9 Given any target F , a controller E is said to be non-blocking, if
and only if
∃a ∈ Act F a→ F ′ ⇒ ∃b ∈ Act ∪ {τ} E . F b→ E′ . F ′′
where E′ is also a non-blocking controller. Note that we do not impose F ′ = F ′′,
since E might not let F perform its intended action, as it is the case with the
insertion rule.
4.1 Soundness and Transparency
Classical properties of a controller are soundness and transparency: intuitively,
a controller is sound if, and only if, any output trace is correct, i.e., it has weight
true in our framework, and transparent if, and only if, any correct trace of the
target is not modified by the controller.
Definition 10 Given a property P , a process A satisfies P if, and only if:
∀t ∈ T (AMP ) |t| = true
A controller E is sound for P if, and only if, given any target F , E .F satisfies
P . In addition, E is said to be transparent for P if, and only if, for any target
F satisfying P , we have T (F ) = T (E . F ).
The controllers E2, E3 and E5 are sound and transparent, while E1 is trans-
parent, but not sound. It is worth observing that given a property P , if E is
sound for P , then we trivially have J(E . F ) MP )K = true, but the reverse
does not necessarily hold. Indeed, the valuation of a controlled process returns
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the best possible evaluation, so as long as one trace in (E .F )MP has weight
true, the whole process also evaluates to true. In other words, in the context of
security, the valuation of a process can be seen as: if J(E . F )MP K = false,
then there is no possibility for the controlled process to satisfy P .
4.2 Controller Quantities
In the previous example, we monitor the security policy on the controlled target,
rather than controlling the monitored target. This latter approach would indeed
maintain the weight of some of the bad actions, and so the value of each trace
would not match the satisfaction of the policy. Of course, it might be valuable
to record this information, in order to monitor how many times the target tried
to violate the policy. Hence, using the simple cartesian composition C , where
each operation is defined in a point-wise way, given a target F , a controller E and
a security monitor MP , a trace t belonging to the process (E.(FMP ))CMP
has a weight (b1, b2), where b1 indicates whether the target tried to violate the
policy, and b2 whether this trace actually satisfies the policy.
In order to be consistent with the rules of the semantics, if the controlled
target is labelled with some weight, the controller needs to be labelled with
compatible weights. In the previous example, the controller can for instance be
labelled with true, since it is the neutral value of the multiplication. Hence,
the weight of the target is that of the controlled target. However, it might be
desirable in some cases to monitor both the controller and the target indepen-
dently. For instance, the controlling actions can be associated with a notion of
cost [11].
Example 5 The monitor Mn defined in Example 2 can be extended to also
monitor controlling actions, in such a way that accepting an action costs 0,
suppressing the action a costs 1 and inserting the action b costs 2:
Mc = (a, 0).Mc + (b, 0).Mc
+(a, 1).Mc + (a.b, 2).Mc
The global energy consumed both by a controller E and a target F can be obtained
with (E Mc) . (F M1). For instance, given the process A = a.b.a and the
controller E2 of Example 4, we have:
(E2 Mc) . (a.b.aM1) τ,1+3→ (E2 Mc) . (b.aM1)
τ,0+2→ (E1 Mc) . (aM2)
τ,0+3→ (E1 Mc) . (0M2)
which raises a total energy consumed of 9. In order to measure only the energy
consumed by the controlled target, taking also into account controlling actions,
one should instead consider the process ((E Mc) . (λ0(F )))‖{a,b}M1, i.e., the
process in wihch F is labelled with the weight 0 of the semiring of cost by the
labelling function λ0.
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Note we can use directly the parallel composition with M1, since the con-
trolled target is already labelled with energy quantities. In this case, for A = a.b.a
and E2, the total energy consumed is only 6, since the energy of the first action
a is not taken into account.
4.3 Evaluation Strategy
In order to evaluate a given controller against a given target, different labelling
functions can be used, and as shown above, the actual order can have an impact
on the global valuation. For the sake of clarity, we introduce the notion of
matching operator on, which has the following form:
E on F = λT (λE(E) . λF (F ))
where λE labels the controller, λF labels the target and λT labels the controlled
target.
Example 6 The different evaluation strategies defined in this paper can be sum-
marised as:
E onD F = λ1(E) . (F MP )
E onP F = (E . F )MP
E onC F = (E Mc) . (F M1)
E onG F = MP L (E onC F )
where onD detects policy violations, even if they are corrected by the controller,
onP monitors the satisfaction of the policy by the controlled target, onC monitors
the energy of both the controller and the target, and onG defines a lexicographic
measure of the cost and the satisfaction of the policy.
5 Ordering controller strategies
In this section, we present a way to compare different controller strategies.
Firstly, since we can always get the valuation of two controllers for a given target,
we can easily compare them accordingly. We then generalize this ordering to
any target.
5.1 Classification of controllers
In this section we provide a classification regardless of the considered semiring.
This means that we classify both sound and not sound controllers. This leaves
to the user the choice of the measure that has to be used for classifying controller
strategies. Indeed, according to which measure the user is going to prioritize,
we can define different controllers. We investigate these aspects in this section.
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Definition 11 Given a target F and a matching operator on, a controller E2
is better than a controller E1 with respect to F , and in this case, we write
E1 von,F E2, if and only if JE1 on F K v JE2 on F K.
This definition does not directly depend on the semiring used to quantify the
controlled target, and it is therefore possible to use the same definition to say
that a controller is better than another one with respect to a security monitor,
a cost monitor or any other measure. In the following, we shall provide some
examples.
Although the ordering we define is total for a fixed target, it might be that a
controller is better than another one for a specific target, but that the converse
holds for some other target. Hence, we introduce a stricter ordering.
Definition 12 Given two controllers E1 and E2 and a matching operator on,
we say that E2 is always better than E1, and in this case we write E1 von E2
if, and only if E1 von,F E2, for any target F . In addition, if E1 von E2 and
there exists at least one target F such that JE1 on F K @ JE2 on F K, we say that
E2 is strictly better than E1, and write E1 @on E2.
Since each individual trace can be represented as a target, it implies that the
valuation of E1 should be lower for every possible trace. Hence, this definition
identifies the cases where a controller strategy is always better than another
one.
Example 7 Let us extend the example described in Section 3, such that we have
now three actions {a, b, c}, and a policy P stating that any trace should start
with at least one action b. Now, consider the four following controllers:
E1 = a.E1 + b.E1 + c.E1
E2 = a.E2 + b.E1 + c.E2
E3 = a.E3 + b.E1 +c.E3
E4 = a.b.E1 + b.E1 +c.b.E1
Intuitively, E1 accepts all actions, E2 suppresses all initial actions a, but accepts
action c, E3 suppresses both actions a and c, and E4 inserts a b before any initial
a or c. As soon as an action b is performed, all processes are equivalent to E1,
and accept all actions.
Since E3 and E4 are sound, we have JE3 onP F K = JE4 onP F K = true, for
any target F . In addition, given any target F such that JE2 onP F K = false,
we also have JE1 onP F K = false. Since there are also targets F such thatJE2 onP F K = true and JE1 onP F K = false, we have
E1 @onP E2 @onP E3 ≡onP E4
where ≡on is the equivalence relation induced by the partial order von . In other
words, E3 and E4 are maximal, and E1 is strictly worse than E2.
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However, it is worth observing that E1 is not the worst possible controller.
Indeed, E1 leaves untouched the correct traces of F , meaning that there exists
some target F such that JE1 onP F K = true. The worst controller always outputs
incorrect traces, even when the target is correct. For instance, we can define the
controller E0 = b.a.E0 + a.E0 + c.E0, which satisfies JE0 onP F K = false, for
any target F .
In some cases, controllers can be incomparable. In the previous example, the
controller that only suppresses bad actions a is incomparable with the one that
only suppresses bad actions c. Furthermore, the choice of the controlling oper-
ators can have an impact on the overall evaluation.
We believe this example to be representative of the contribution of our frame-
work. Indeed, a traditional, qualitative analysis would label E3 and E4 as sound
on the one hand, and E0, E1 and E2 as equally incorrect on the other hand.
The quantitative analysis provides us instead with an ordering over controllers.
Of course, it is always desirable to use a sound controller, but when such an
option is not available, it is useful to know which one is the next best. For in-
stance, if one cannot implement the controlling strategy E3 because the action
c is uncontrollable [1], i.e., cannot be suppressed or protected, then a security
designer may prefer to choose E2 over E1, and certainly over E0.
The controllers E3 and E4 are equivalent, since they are both sound, and, if
policy satisfaction is the only criterion, a security designer might choose either.
However, other dimensions can easily be included within our framework, with
the intuition that the more accurate is the quantification of the controlled sys-
tem, the more informed is the security designer to choose a particular controller.
Example 8 In order to compare the previous controllers E3 and E4, let us
consider the matching operator onG with the extended cost monitor defined in
Example 5:
Mc = (a, 0).Mc + (b, 0).Mc + (c, 0).Mc + (a, 1).Mc
+(c, 1).Mc + (a.b, 2).Mc + (c.b, 2).Mc
First, it is worth observing that since we use the lexicographic ordering, the re-
lations E1 @onG E2 @onG E3 and E1 @onG E2 @onG E4 still hold. However, E3
and E4 are no longer equivalent, and as matter of fact, they become incompa-
rable. Indeed, consider the target F1 = a: we have JE3 onG F1K = (true, 1) andJE4 onG F1K = (true, 2), meaning that E4 @F1 E3. On the other hand, given the
target F2 = a.a.a, we have JE3 onG F1K = (true, 3) and JE4 onG F1K = (true, 2),
meaning that E3 @F2 E4, and therefore that E3 and E4 are incomparable.
The previous example illustrates that, in general, there might not be a strictly
best strategy. In some cases, it might be possible to define an optimal strategy,
which is best in average. For instance, in the previous example, if each trace
can be associated with a probability, then the expected cost of each controller
can be computed, thus providing a unique best controller.
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5.2 Classification of quantitative controllers
In our examples we use the lexicographic order for comparing controller strate-
gies when we consider more than one measure on it. Indeed, using the lexico-
graphic order on tuples of values, one may prioritize one dimension over another
(depending on the order of the components in the lexicographic order itself).
According to which dimension is prioritized, we are able to classify controllers
into categories.
Secure controllers We have a secure controller when controllers are ordered
based on their security, that is, how many traces are correct. This measure
depends on the number of traces t ∈ T (E) such that |t| = true. Optimal
controllers are those that never violate the policy in conjunction with any target.
Economical controllers We have an economical controller when priority is
given to the dimension of cost. Hence, the obtained order on controllers consid-
ers the cost on each trace. The optimal controller is the one that costs less.
Ecological controllers Consider the semiring of costs as a measure of con-
sumed energy, and consider again the semiring of costs, interpreted as a measure
of ecological impact (the lower, the better). Then one can measure the ecologi-
cal impact for the consumed energy by prioritizing with respect to the semiring
of cost.
6 Related Work
Using a notion of risk (i.e., a conjunction of probability and impact) has been
considered for access control systems, for instance by Cheng et al. [9], who
consider that the level of security should correspond to a fuzzy domain rather
than a strict separation between what is secure and what is not. Similarly, Zhang
et al. define with the BARAC model [31] a notion of benefit for each access,
with the underlying idea that allowing an access comes with a benefit for the
system (while we take in this paper, a somewhat dual approach, by considering
that denying an access might come with a cost for the system). The “value”
of an access or an action can be for instance calculated using market-based
techniques [27].
The problem of finding an optimal control strategy is considered by Easwaran
et al. in [14] in the context of software monitoring, where the system is rep-
resented as a Directed Acyclic Graph, and where rewards and penalties with
correcting actions are taken into account, thus using dynamic programming to
find the optimal solution. Similarly, an encoding of access control mechanisms
using Markov Decision Process is proposed in [25], where the optimal policy can
be derived by solving the corresponding optimisation problem. From a different
perspective, Bielova and Massacci propose in [3] a notion of distance among
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traces, thus expressing that if a trace is not secure, it should be edited to a se-
cure trace close to the non-secure one, thus characterizing enforcement strategies
by the distance from the original trace they create. In a recent approach [11],
a notion of cost similar to that used in this paper is used to compare correct
enforcement mechanisms (defined as state machines) with different enforcement
strategies.
In this work, we focus on using a generalised notion of weight expressed as
an element of a semiring, following some intuitive leads given in [24] in order to
move from qualitative to quantitative enforcement. Semirings have been used
by Bistarelli et al. in the context of access control [6] and trust systems [5]. Here
we use them in the context of enforcement mechanism defined using a process
algebra, following the approach by Buchholz and Kemper [7].
We also consider in this paper the possibility for a controller not to be
correct, i.e., to allow for some violations of the policy. Such a possibility is
quantified over traces in [12] for non-safety policy, where a controller cannot
be both correct and fully transparent. Caravagna et al. consider in [8] the
notion of lazy controllers, which only control the security of a system at some
points in time, and based on a probabilistic modelling of the system, quantify
the expected risk. Basin et al. consider in [1] the case where some actions
are uncontrollable (i.e., cannot be stopped), and define what policies can then
be enforced, by modeling a controller as a Deterministic Turing Machine. In
the context of access control, Molloy et al. use a machine learning approach to
predict the decision for a given request [28], and balance the risk of error against
the cost of contacting the real mechanism to get the actual decision.
7 Discussion - Future work
Our framework allows a security designer to consider a security policy as yet an-
other quantity to measure. Instead of a binary classification between sound and
unsound controllers, we provide a finer-grained ordering, distinguishing between
different degrees of soundness. Several dimensions can easily be accommodated.
A first point worth discussing is whether the valuation of processes should re-
turn the best-case scenario, as done in our current framework, or should instead
return the worst-case scenario, thus following a rather traditional, pessimistic
approach to security. If the C-semiring is equipped with a subtraction oper-
ation, i.e., an inverse to the addition operation, then such a valuation can be
calculated as the subtraction of all the weights of the traces. For instance, in
the boolean semiring, subtraction corresponds to conjunction, and it is easy to
see that the valuation of a process would be true only if all traces evaluate to
true. Similarly, subtraction in the cost semiring corresponds to max ; in this case
the valuation would return the highest possible cost. However, not all semirings
have a subtraction operation. We plan to investigate this problem in future
work.
As discussed at the end of Section 5, some controllers are incomparable. In
some cases, it might be desirable to try to compare them nonetheless. A first
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step is to consider a single target when comparing two controllers, although,
as said above, only the best-case scenarios are compared, which might not be
fine-grained enough. One could however associate a weight to each target, and
compose this weight with the valuation of each controller for each considered
target. For instance, if we can define the probability of each target, and the
valuation returns the energy spent by the controlled process, then it is possible to
obtain the expected amount of energy spent by each controller. The expectation
semiring [16] can be used in this process.
It is noteworthy that, given any two processes A and B, we have JAK vJA + BK, for any measured quantity. Indeed, the best case of A + B is neces-
sarily higher than the best case of A. In practice, given two controllers E1 and
E2, JE1 . F K v J(E1 + E2) . F K, for any target F . In other words, adding non-
deterministic choice to the controller itself always improves security. Clearly,
this characteristic is mostly of theoretical importance, but it raises the interest-
ing question whether, given some quantities, there exists a deterministic max-
imal controller or not. For instance, given any safety property, we can build
an optimal deterministic controller if we only monitor security. However, if we
add a notion of cost as in Example 8, we have two incomparable deterministic
controllers, which are strictly worse than their non-deterministic composition.
It would therefore be interesting to study the class of quantities that are en-
forceable by a deterministic enforceable controller against those for which only a
non-deterministic controller is optimal, in a way loosely similar to the difference
between the classes P and NP in computational complexity.
Finally, our notion of a security policy is just a set of finite traces that
a process is allowed to use. This set could be specified by e.g. automata or
logics. Predicates, and formulas specifying them, could also be quantitative
by themselves, e.g. employing logics with valuations in a C-semiring (see e.g.
[18, 10]). In this paper, we do not yet investigate this aspect of the framework;
this is left as future work. In particular, we plan to use quantitative evaluation
of security policies, specified by logic formulas, in order to extend previous work
on automated verification and synthesis of (qualitative) controllers [21].
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